Revisiting the trade effects of services agreements by Shingal, Anirudh
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Revisiting the trade effects of services
agreements
Anirudh Shingal
29. September 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51243/
MPRA Paper No. 51243, posted 7. November 2013 03:02 UTC
Revisiting the trade eﬀects of services agreements
Anirudh Shingal∗
29 September 2013
Abstract
The proliferation of services trade agreements and improved availability of data on
bilateral services trade ﬂows has resulted in a growing literature on the theoretical and
empirical assessment of services trade eﬀects. In this paper, we revisit the trade eﬀects
of services agreements using an updated database on bilateral services trade ﬂows from
the OECD and based on recent developments in the estimation of structural gravity
models. Our results suggest a services trade eﬀect of 13.7% at the intensive margin, with
signiﬁcantly higher estimates for intra-EU trade. However, the trade eﬀect becomes
weakly signiﬁcant when the estimation includes zero trade ﬂows. Incorporation of
anticipation eﬀects in the analyses accentuates the average treatment eﬀect signiﬁcantly
(and monotonically with time) but only at the intensive margin.
JEL classiﬁcation: F10, F13, F15
Key words: Services trade, PTAs, gravity model, endogeneity, anticipation eﬀects
∗Senior Research Fellow, WTI, University of Bern. I would like to thank the Swiss NCCR in Trade Regu-
lation for ﬁnancial support and Sebastien Miroudot for generous use of the updated OECD database used in
this paper. This paper was presented at the 2013 World Trade Forum in Bern. Address for correspondence:
World Trade Institute, Hallerstrasse 6, CH - 3012, Bern. Tel: +41-31-6313270; Fax: +41-31-6313630; Email:
anirudh.shingal@wti.org.
1 Introduction
One of the striking features of trade diplomacy in recent years has been the pace of prefer-
ential goods trade liberalization and rule-making. More recently, a similar trend is observed
regarding services trade. Of the 83 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) notiﬁed to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and in force prior to the year 2000, 73 (87.9%) featured
provisions dealing exclusively with trade in goods. Since then, another 176 PTAs went into
force of which 105 (59.7%) also include provisions on services trade1. This development in-
dicates the rising importance of services trade in general, the growing need felt by countries
to place such trade on a ﬁrmer institutional and rule-making footing, and the attractiveness
of doing so on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating platforms (Sauvé and Shingal,
2011).
Economic literature is replete with theoretical models and empirical analyses documenting
the impact of PTAs on trade between partner countries. Most of this work, however, tra-
ditionally looked at trade in merchandise goods only. An important reason for this was the
lack of availability of bilateral services trade data. This lacuna was, however, ﬁlled with
the publication of the OECD's database on bilateral services trade2; since its publication
Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003), Mirza and Nicoletti (2004),Ceglowski (2006), Kimura and Lee
(2006), Kox and Lejour (2006), Walsh (2006), Lennon (2008), Shingal (2009), Marchetti
(2011) and Egger et al. (2012) have used this dataset to examine the trade eﬀect of services
accords on aggregate and disaggregated services trade ﬂows.
The earlier papers in this literature were constrained by limited coverage both in terms of
the country sample and time period. However, Marchetti (2011) was able to exploit a larger
data set comprising 30 OECD exporters and 55 OECD and non-OECD importers over 1999-
2006. Egger et.al. (2012), on the other hand, focussed on bilateral services trade among
16 European OECD countries over 1999-2006. This literature is also diverse in terms of
the model speciﬁcations, estimation methodologies (OLS, IV, Fixed Eﬀects, SUR, Poisson
PML, Hausman-Taylor, SFGNLS) and the magnitudes of the estimated trade eﬀects3. While
1As of 15 August 2013, the total number of STAs in force was 118. These included three alliances
(MERCOSUR, EFTA and CARICOM) where an STA was negotiated after 2000 in addition to a pre-existing
trade agreement in goods.
2In 2002, the OECD Secretariat presented data on total trade in services, broken down by partner country,
for 26 OECD member countries over 1999-2002. This has now been extended to cover 35 reporting countries
from the OECD, 238 OECD and non-OECD partner countries and 12 years (1999-2010).
3For instance, Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003) and Walsh (2006) found the trade eﬀects to be statistically
insigniﬁcant while Lennon (2008), Shingal (2009) and Marchetti (2011) reported estimates of around 15%.
The trade eﬀects were higher in Ceglowski, 2006 (38-68%), Kimura & Lee, 2006 (24.5%) and Kox & Lejour,
2006 (30-62%) though the latter only studied the EU15. Egger et.al. 2012 (219.6%) reported the largest
estimates but they only considered services trade among 16 European OECD countries.
Shingal (2009) was the ﬁrst paper in the services literature to endogenize STA membership
and account for its lagged eﬀects on trade empirically, none of the other cited papers have
addressed these issues.
In this paper, we revisit the trade eﬀects of services agreements using the OECD's up-
dated database on bilateral services trade ﬂows with greater country (35 exporters and 238
importers) and time coverage (1999-2010). Our empirical analyses are based on recent de-
velopments in the estimation of structural gravity models (for instance see Head and Mayer,
2013). In addition to accounting for the phasing-in of STAs empirically and treating STA
membership as endogenous, we also examine trade eﬀects of STA membership allowing for
zero trade ﬂows.
Our results suggest a (weakly signiﬁcant) trade eﬀect of 16.1% from having a services accord
(13.7% at the intensive margin). This eﬀect rises to 26.1% for the intra-EU trading partners
in our sample, with the intensive margin results much higher at 53.4%. The services trade
eﬀect is also found to get signiﬁcantly accentuated once anticipation eﬀects of accession are
included in the analysis but only at the intensive margin. These results also suggest that
the maximum impact of a services accord is felt the farthest in time from actual accession;
thus services agreements seem to have a signiﬁcant announcement eﬀect for ﬁrms already
engaged in services trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical
framework underlying our empirical strategy in Section 3. Section 4 looks at the data while
Section 5 discusses estimation issues. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Following Van Wincoop and Anderson (2003) and Anderson et al. (2011), our structural
gravity model is as follows:
X ijt =
EjtYit
Yt
(
τijt
PjtΠit
)1−σ
..............................................................................................(1)
where X ijt is the value of nominal bilateral exports of services between origin i and destina-
tion j at time t, Ej is the expenditure on services in the destination market from all origins,
Y i is the sale of services at destination prices from i to all destinations, Y is world services
output at delivered prices, τ ij are the bilateral trade costs, σ is the elasticity of substitu-
tion amongst services and P j, Πi are the (inward and outward, respectively) multilateral
resistance (MR) terms as deﬁned in this literature.
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The bilateral trade costs in τ ijt are typically proxied by bilateral distance between capitals
of the two countries (DIST ij), incidence of and heterogeneity between (restrictive) services
regulation (REGij), and indicators for common international borders (BORDij), language
(LANGij), colonial origins (COLij), legal systems (LEGij) and membership of PTAs (in
the context of this paper, services trade agreements or STAijt).
These proxy variables typically enter τ ijt as follows:
τ 1−σijt = exp(β1lnDISTij + β2BORDij + β3LANGij + β4COLij + β5LEGij + β6lnREGij +
δSTAijt)...(2)
Substituting (2) into (1) and adding an error term, yields the following multiplicative model:
X ijt = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δSTAijt + αit + γjt)εijt..................................................................(3)
where Zij = (1,lnDIST ij,BORDij,...) is a vector with a constant and all bilateral trade
costs except STAijt, β is the coeﬃcient vector corresponding to the elements in Zij with
β0 = −lnYt and εijt is the error term. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the exporter-
time (αit) and importer-time (γjt) ﬁxed eﬀects in (3) account for the time-varying MR terms
in a panel setting.
However, (3) does not account for a signiﬁcant charateristic of most bilateral trade data -
the existence of export zeroes4. This is even more true of bilateral services trade data,
which also tend to report a signiﬁcant number of missing observations.
This dichotomy in bilateral export ﬂows can be represented by an indicator variable Ωijwhich
takes the value 1 if the aggregate of the representative ﬁrm in i can cover the ﬁxed costs
(f ij) of entering j and 0 otherwise. For the representative ﬁrm, Ωij = 1 if pixij ≥ σfijwhere
p are the mill prices and x denotes ﬁrm-level shipments (for instance see Egger et al., 2011).
Thus, (3) can be adjusted to include the possibility of zero export ﬂows as follows:
X ijt = Ωijexp(Z
′
ijβ + δSTAijt + αit + γjt)εijt........................................(4)
Finally, (3) and (4) assume that STA membership is exogenous. However, in a signiﬁcant
departure from earlier work, researchers (Magee, 2004; Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2004,
2007; Egger et al., 2008) have begun to treat PTA membership as endogenous based on the
intuition that if there is a tendency for countries to self-select5 themselves into an accord,
then treating PTA membership as exogenous would under-estimate the magnitude of the
4For instance see Helpman et al. (2008) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
5i.e. countries that enter into an agreement are already those that trade signiﬁcantly with each other and
vice versa.
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trade eﬀect6. Thus one can allow for possible correlation between εijt and the propensity to
negotiate a STA essentially making STA membership endogenous. For instance, Egger et.
al. (2011) have provided a reduced form estimation of a theory-consistent gravity model that
endogenizes the impact of PTA membership and also accounts for trade at both margins.
3 Empirical model
(3) is estimated by taking logs on either side:
lnX ijt = µij+ αit + γjt + ρt+ δSTAijt+ εijt.............................................................(5)
where all the dyadic trade costs in τ ij are captured in the pair-wise ﬁxed eﬀects µij. Signiﬁ-
cantly, the inclusion of pair-wise, importer-time and exporter-time ﬁxed eﬀects also enables
an endogenous treatment of the STA variable (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
Baier & Bergstrand (2007) also accounted for the phasing-in of PTAs by introducing the
lagged eﬀects of PTA on trade. Given that every PTA has a phase-in period, typically
over 10 years7, the entire treatment eﬀect on trade cannot be captured in the concurrent
year. They therefore used one or two lagged levels of the PTA variable in their estimation
(PTAij,t−1 and PTAij,t−2), which accentuates the average treatment eﬀect (ATE). Since
they used a panel of cross-section time series data at ﬁve-year intervals from 1960 to 2000,
they thus included ten years preceding accession to study the anticipation eﬀects of PTAs
on trade.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we augment (5) to include STA anticipation eﬀects
for up to ten years preceding coming into eﬀect of the agreement, thus:
lnX ijt = µij+ αit + γjt + ρt+ δSTAijt +
∑10
k=1 ηSTAijt−k+ εijt.............................(6)
where η is the coeﬃcient vector corresponding to the elements in STAijt−k.
Finally, to conﬁrm the absence of any feedback eﬀects from trade changes to changes in STA
membership, we also estimated the following speciﬁcation:
lnX ijt = µij+ αit + γjt + ρt+ δSTAijt +
∑10
k=1 ηSTAijt−k +
∑5
m=1 θSTAijt+m+ εijt......(7)
where θ is the coeﬃcient vector corresponding to the elements in STAijt+m.
6For instance, Baier & Bergstrand (2007) ﬁnd the trade eﬀect from goods agreements to quintuple once
PTA membership is endogeneized econometrically.
7For instance, both the original EEC agreement of 1958 and the NAFTA had a 10-year phase-in provision.
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4 Data
Data on X ijt are taken from the OECD's Bilateral Trade in Services database. These include
6095 trading partner pairs between 35 exporting and 238 importing countries over 1999-2010
(the list of countries is reported in Annex Table A1). Of these, 203 trading partners reported
negative services exports and assuming reporting errors, these values were taken as zero8. In
addition, data on services exports were found unreported for 7147 out of 44322 observations,
which, following this literature, were also assumed to be zero9. This brought the total number
of export zeroes in the sample to 19700 (44.4% of the full sample).
Data on trade agreements are taken from theWTO's Regional Trade Agreements Information
System (RTA-IS) database, where STA = 1 for agreements notiﬁed under Article V of the
GATS during 1958-2010 and 0 otherwise. Since our data cover the period 1999-2010, if a
services agreement was reached before 1999, the STA variable takes a value 1 over 1999-2010.
On the other hand, if the agreement came into eﬀect after 1999, then the variable takes a
value 1 in the year the STA entered into force and every year after that and the value 0
otherwise. This treatment also rendered STAijt time-variant, which, from the perspective of
economteric analysis, meant that it could be retrieved in pair-wise ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations.
Annex Table A2 shows the mean value for both variables, along with the minimum, maximum
and the standard deviation.
Figure 1 shows trading partner dyads in our sample that had bilateral services exports
exceeding $10 bn over 1999-2010. Looking at these export averages over 1999-2010, we ﬁnd
that 29 trading pairs (0.5% of the 6095 dyads) had bilateral services exports in excess of $10
bn and interestingly, more than half of these (18) had a services trade agreement in force in
2013.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Table 1 shows the decile distribution of (positive) bilateral services exports averaged over
1999-2010 and the existence of STAs. The top decile (n = 385, accounting for 6.3% of all
trading pairs in the sample) had an average services export value of $3.7 bn; nearly half
of these dyads had a services trade agreement in force in 2013. Table 1 also suggests that
the distribution of bilateral services exports over 1999-2010 was highly skewed with the
average for the top decile being more than 28000 times greater than that of the last decile!
8In our sensitivity analyses, we also ran our regressions without these observations but found the results
to be qualitatively similar.
9Low thresholds for reporting and measurement errors can be responsible for both unreported ﬂows and
for export zeroes.
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Signiﬁcantly, as one goes down the deciles, the propensity to negotiate a services accord also
declines, which highlights the endogenous relationship between these two variables. Bilateral
services exports are also found to be 5.7 times greater amongst all dyads in our sample in
the presence of a services accord than otherwise.
<Insert Table 1 here>
5 Estimation issues
Empirically, (5), (6) and (7) can be estimated log-linearly using OLS. However, this excludes
the treatment of export zeroes (as the log of zero is not deﬁned) and the incidence of export
zeroes was fairly high in our data (44.4%). Selection of the appropriate estimator in the
presence of zeroes is contingent on the process generating the error term. Following Head
and Mayer (2013), we found our data to be characterized by a constant variance to mean ratio
(CVMR) which suggested the use of the Poisson PML (PPML) for inference. Importantly,
PPML10 estimates remain consistent in the presence of over-dispersion, which was also true
of our data (see Colin and Trivedi, 2005; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
Unfortunately, the PPML estimation of (5), (6) and (7) with several high dimensional ﬁxed
eﬀects led to non-convergence. This did not change even with the application of diﬀerent
work-around strategies suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) such as rescaling
the dependent variable, trying diﬀerent optimisation methods and convergence criteria, and
identifying and removing the regressors causing the non-existence of PML estimates using
the algorithm from Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011).
Given the need for at least two-high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects in estimating these equations,
another possibility was the use of the 2WFE approach developed by Guimaraes and Por-
tugal (2010). This allows for estimating linear regressions model with two high-dimensional
ﬁxed eﬀects with minimal memory requirements. Head and Mayer (2013) ﬁnd the 2WFE
estimator to provide identical estimates to the LSDV (Harrigan, 1996) without being subject
to arbitrary limits. They also recommend the 2WFE over other estimation strategies such
as double-demeaning, Bonus Vetus OLS (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009) and tetrads (Head
et al., 2010).
10The PPML advocates the use of a simple Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood because in the presence
of heteroskedasticity in the data, the standard log-linearized gravity model yields inconsistent estimates
(Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). An additional problem of log-linearization is that it is incompatible with the
existence of zeroes in trade data, which led to several unsatisfactory solutions, including truncation of the
sample and further non-linear transformations of the dependent variable. (Silva & Tenreyro, op.cit., pp 653)
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Thus, (5), (6) and (7) were estimated log-linearly using the 2WFE estimator.
However, this strategy would only work at the intensive margin. To include export zeroes
in the 2WFE estimation, we followed the approach by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and as-
sumed that there was a minimum level of services exports  such that when gravity-predicted
X ijt < , the observed value of services exports was zero. Although  is unknown, it can
be approximated by the minimum observed services exports for each destination market
(minXj).
Unlike the practice of adding an arbitrary constant to the export zeroes, this approach is more
intuitive as the minimum trade ﬂow for a speciﬁc importer would tend to reﬂect diﬀerences
in market size, competition, trade barriers, as well as reporting and measurement issues.
The approach is also consistent with theory and does not require exclusion restrictions.
Furthermore, transforming the dependent variable by adding a minimum observed export
value (X ijt +minXj) is not scale dependent.
Thus, the equations were also estimated log-linearly by replacing X ijt with (X ijt +minXj)
to incorporate the export zeroes in the analyses.
6 Results
The intensive margin results from estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 2. In this
table, columns I-IV report results for four diﬀerent samples: all, only-EU, only non-EU, at
least one EU. The (services) trade eﬀects range from 13.7%11 for the full sample to 53.4%
amongst the EU member states. As in Shingal (2009), services accords did not seem to
enhance bilateral services trade amongst the non-EU trading partners in the sample. On
the other hand, even with one of the partners being from the EU, the (services) trade eﬀect
again became positive and economically signiﬁcant (33.4%).
<Insert Table 2 here>
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (5) after incorporating the export zeroes
in the sample. One would expect these coeﬃcients to have lower magnitudes compared to
the baseline results as the regressions now incorporate zero export ﬂows. However, the
(services) trade eﬀect for the complete sample seems to be enhanced now though it is weakly
signiﬁcant. The eﬀects for the EU are reduced while those for the non-EU partners are
statistical indiﬀerent from zero.
11This is calculated as {exp(δ)− 1} ∗ 100 where δ is the coeﬃcient on the STA variable.
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<Insert Table 3 here>
The lagged eﬀects of STA on trade for all sample countries are reported in Table 4. Like
Baier & Bergstrand (2007), we too found the ATE to be accentuated by including such
anticipation eﬀects. These results show that the total ATE increases the further back in
time one travels from the year of accession of the STA. This suggests that the maximum
impact of a services accord may be felt the farthest in time from actual accession and
that services agreements seem to have a signiﬁcant announcement eﬀect. This said, the
respective coeﬃcients retain statistical signiﬁcance only up to ﬁve years preceding the year
of accession. Thus, the estimates of the total ATE are arguably more meaningful until t− 5
and suggest a cumulative trade eﬀect of 157.5%. We also ﬁnd the coeﬃcients to be more
economically signiﬁcant three to ﬁve years preceding accession. Signiﬁcantly, the (services)
trade eﬀect in the actual year of accession also increases monotonically with time with the
inclusion of anticipation eﬀects.
<Insert Table 4 here>
Finally, Table 5 reports the results on the post-accession eﬀects of STAs for all sample
countries. These estimated coeﬃcients on STAijt+m are statistically indiﬀerent from zero
from one for up to ﬁve years after accession, which suggests that changes in STA membership
are strictly exogenous to changes in bilateral services trade ﬂows. Signiﬁcantly, the total
ATE is larger in magnitude compared to the results in Table 4, which suggests that the
anticipation eﬀects, still statistically signiﬁcant until t − 5, get further accentuated in this
estimation.
<Insert Table 5 here>
We also estimated equations (6) and (7) for the full sample including the export zeroes.
The results, reported in Table 6 and 7, lacked statistical signiﬁcance in most cases, though
STA membership continued to be associated with positive trade eﬀects concurrently in some
speciﬁcations in Table 6.
<Insert Tables 6 and 7 here>
7 Conclusion
This paper revisits the trade eﬀect of services accords using an updated OECD database
on bilateral services trade ﬂows and following recent advancements in the literature on the
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estimation of structural gravity models. We estimate the trade eﬀects from negotiating
services agreements allowing for zero trade ﬂows and the possibility of self-selection into
STA membership. Our intensive margin results are somewhat consistent with those found
in the earlier services literature but the trade eﬀects are smaller compared to those of goods
agreements (for instance see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). At the same time, we ﬁnd more
pronounced anticipation eﬀects for ﬁrms already engaged in services trade once we account
for the lagged eﬀects of STA membership, both compared to the results for services in Shingal
(2009) and those for goods (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). The inclusion of zero export ﬂows,
on the other hand, led to statistically insigniﬁcant results but not for intra-EU services trade.
A shortcoming in the analysis undertaken in this paper is the homogeneity of the STA vari-
ables, the calibration of which does not take into account the varying extents of liberalization
in diﬀerent agreements. This could therefore be an agenda for further research. It may also
be interesting to examine the results in this paper using alternative estimation stategies such
as the Heckman (1979) and the bivariate probit (Egger et.al., 2011).
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Figure 1: Top services export ﬂows ($ bn, avg. 1999-2010)

0 10 20 30 40 50
GBR-NLD
GBR-FRA
FRA-DEU
KOR-USA
NLD-GBR
FRA-BEL
NLD-DEU
HKG-USA
ESP-DEU
ITA-DEU
USA-FRA
DEU-CHE
GBR-DEU
HKG-CHN
AUT-DEU
IRL-GBR
FRA-GBR
FRA-USA
DEU-GBR
USA-MEX
USA-DEU
ESP-GBR
DEU-USA
JPN-USA
CAN-USA
USA-CAN
USA-JPN
GBR-USA
USA-GBR
10.5
10.9
11.3
11.3
11.5
11.9
12.5
12.6
12.7
12.8
12.9
13.4
13.7
15.2
15.6
15.8
15.8
16.3
16.5
18.4
19.6
22.1
22.6
29.1
29.5
32.1
35.8
42.4
42.6
Source: OECD; own calculations
Note: Dyads shaded in blue had a services trade agreement in force in 2013; those shaded in grey did not.
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Table 1: Decile distribution of bilateral services exports (avg. 1999-2010)
Deciles (n = 3850) Avg. Xij ($ mn) STA
D1 3776.8 0.49
D2 395.0 0.35
D3 133.1 0.32
D4 53.7 0.26
D5 24.8 0.27
D6 11.5 0.17
D7 5.3 0.20
D8 2.2 0.16
D9 0.7 0.15
D10 0.1 0.07
D1/D10 28072.4 7.3
Source: OECD; own calculations
Table 2: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (5) on positive exports
Dep var: lnXijt (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Only EU Only non-EU One EU
STAijt 0.128** 0.428*** -0.157* 0.288***
(0.041) (0.046) (0.077) (0.050)
ATE 13.7% 53.4% -14.5% 33.4%
N 24622 4790 3003 21619
df_m 5981 909 1760 5378
r2 0.968 0.978 0.996 0.963
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) ATE = Average
treatment eﬀect
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Table 3: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (5) on all exports
Dep var: ln(Xijt+minXj) (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Only EU Only non-EU One EU
STAijt 0.149# 0.232** -0.035 0.237*
(0.089) (0.086) (0.118) (0.119)
ATE 16.1% 26.1% -3.4% 26.7%
N 44310 5211 4880 39430
df_m 8662 950 2425 7664
r2 0.946 0.939 0.990 0.942
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) ATE = Average
treatment eﬀect
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Table 4: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (6) on positive exports
Dep var: lnXijt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All All All All All All All All All All
STAijt 0.138** 0.140** 0.156*** 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.206***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
STAijt-1 0.101 0.105 0.137 0.161# 0.197* 0.218* 0.229* 0.246** 0.240* 0.246**
(0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095)
STAijt-2 0.018 0.055 0.081 0.117 0.143# 0.157# 0.177* 0.169* 0.177*
(0.074) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.086) (0.087)
STAijt-3 0.163* 0.190* 0.232** 0.257** 0.272** 0.294*** 0.285** 0.294**
(0.078) (0.080) (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) (0.087) (0.089) (0.091)
STAijt-4 0.110 0.152* 0.180* 0.195* 0.220** 0.211* 0.220**
(0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.082) (0.085)
STAijt-5 0.181* 0.211** 0.228** 0.252** 0.241** 0.251**
(0.077) (0.080) (0.082) (0.084) (0.086) (0.090)
STAijt-6 0.106 0.123 0.150# 0.141# 0.152#
(0.080) (0.081) (0.084) (0.086) (0.089)
STAijt-7 0.095 0.125 0.113 0.123
(0.096) (0.098) (0.101) (0.104)
STAijt-8 0.139 0.127 0.140
(0.101) (0.104) (0.108)
STAijt-9 -0.052 -0.039
(0.107) (0.111)
STAijt-10 0.050
(0.117)
Total ATE 14.8% 15.0% 37.6% 43.2% 157.5% 188.6% 207.4% 303.5% 285.4% 303.1%
N 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622
df_m 5982 5983 5984 5985 5986 5987 5988 5989 5990 5991
r2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) Total ATE =
Sum of the STA coeﬃcient estimates statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
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Table 5: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (7) on positive exports
Dep var: lnXijt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All All All
STAijt 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.209***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
STAijt-1 0.231* 0.231* 0.222* 0.233* 0.237*
(0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098)
STAijt-2 0.163# 0.163# 0.157# 0.167# 0.172#
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
STAijt-3 0.276** 0.276** 0.270** 0.279** 0.284**
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
STAijt-4 0.207* 0.207* 0.202* 0.212* 0.215*
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
STAijt-5 0.238** 0.238** 0.233* 0.241** 0.244**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
STAijt-6 0.139 0.139 0.135 0.142 0.144
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091)
STAijt-7 0.112 0.112 0.109 0.114 0.116
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
STAijt-8 0.130 0.130 0.127 0.133 0.135
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
STAijt-9 -0.048 -0.048 -0.051 -0.046 -0.045
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
STAijt-10 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.043 0.045
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
STAijt+1 -0.190# -0.191# -0.202# -0.184 -0.175
(0.112) (0.114) (0.116) (0.118) (0.119)
STAijt+2 -0.001 -0.014 0.004 0.013
(0.120) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125)
STAijt+3 -0.065 -0.042 -0.033
(0.121) (0.123) (0.124)
STAijt+4 0.135 0.148
(0.133) (0.135)
STAijt+5 0.069
(0.123)
Total ATE 220.3% 220.3% 213.0% 224.1% 228.4%
N 24622 24622 24622 24622 24622
df_m 5992 5993 5994 5995 5996
r2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) Total ATE =
Sum of the STA coeﬃcient estimates statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
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Table 6: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (6) on all exports
Dep var: ln(Xijt+minXj) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All All All All All All All All All All
STAijt 0.160# 0.162# 0.174# 0.176# 0.196* 0.203* 0.194# 0.199* 0.189# 0.180#
(0.092) (0.094) (0.095) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)
STAijt-1 0.078 0.084 0.104 0.108 0.151 0.165 0.149 0.159 0.139 0.121
(0.159) (0.163) (0.167) (0.169) (0.174) (0.176) (0.177) (0.178) (0.179) (0.180)
STAijt-2 0.022 0.045 0.049 0.091 0.108 0.090 0.101 0.077 0.057
(0.149) (0.154) (0.157) (0.162) (0.165) (0.166) (0.168) (0.170) (0.171)
STAijt-3 0.102 0.106 0.154 0.170 0.148 0.161 0.134 0.110
(0.161) (0.164) (0.170) (0.173) (0.175) (0.177) (0.179) (0.181)
STAijt-4 0.019 0.064 0.083 0.062 0.079 0.047 0.020
(0.154) (0.160) (0.164) (0.166) (0.169) (0.173) (0.174)
STAijt-5 0.173 0.192 0.168 0.183 0.147 0.119
(0.158) (0.162) (0.165) (0.168) (0.172) (0.174)
STAijt-6 0.074 0.052 0.065 0.041 0.017
(0.138) (0.140) (0.143) (0.145) (0.147)
STAijt-7 -0.138 -0.123 -0.156 -0.179
(0.170) (0.173) (0.177) (0.178)
STAijt-8 0.108 0.064 0.024
(0.221) (0.227) (0.230)
STAijt-9 -0.213 -0.255
(0.235) (0.238)
STAijt-10 -0.229
(0.211)
Total ATE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.7% 22.5% 0.0% 22.0% 0.0% 0.0%
N 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310
df_m 8652 8653 8654 8655 8656 8657 8658 8659 8660 8661
r2 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.947 0.947
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) Total ATE =
Sum of the STA coeﬃcient estimates statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
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Table 7: Results (2WFE) from estimating equation (7) on all exports
Dep var: ln(Xijt+minXj) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All All All
STAijt 0.185# 0.186# 0.190# 0.189# 0.183#
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
STAijt-1 0.113 0.111 0.098 0.100 0.108
(0.181) (0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184)
STAijt-2 0.050 0.047 0.039 0.040 0.049
(0.171) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174)
STAijt-3 0.102 0.099 0.092 0.093 0.100
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.183)
STAijt-4 0.015 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.013
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176)
STAijt-5 0.114 0.112 0.105 0.106 0.111
(0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
STAijt-6 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.013
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147)
STAijt-7 -0.182 -0.183 -0.186 -0.185 -0.183
(0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178)
STAijt-8 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.020
(0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
STAijt-9 -0.258 -0.259 -0.262 -0.261 -0.259
(0.238) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239)
STAijt-10 -0.231 -0.231 -0.233 -0.232 -0.232
(0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211)
STAijt+1 -0.111 -0.119 -0.141 -0.137 -0.113
(0.221) (0.226) (0.229) (0.232) (0.235)
STAijt+2 -0.041 -0.070 -0.064 -0.038
(0.236) (0.241) (0.245) (0.248)
STAijt+3 -0.133 -0.125 -0.088
(0.226) (0.235) (0.241)
STAijt+4 0.029 0.071
(0.239) (0.246)
STAijt+5 0.155
(0.231)
Total ATE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
N 44310 44310 44310 44310 44310
df_m 8662 8663 8664 8665 8666
r2 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947
Fixed effects:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bilateral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-and-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Robust standard errors reported in brackets (3) Total ATE =
Sum of the STA coeﬃcient estimates statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
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Table A1: Sample countries
Exporters: AUS AUT BEL CAN CHL CZE DEU DNK ESP EST FIN FRA GBR GRC
HKG HUN IRL ISL ISR ITA JPN KOR LUX MEX NLD NOR NZL POL PRT RUS SVK
SVN SWE TUR USA
Importers: ABW AFG AGO AIA ALB AND ANT ARE ARG ARM ASM ATA ATF ATG
AUS AUT AZE BDI BEL BEN BFA BGD BGR BHR BHS BIH BLR BLZ BMU BOL BRA
BRB BRN BTN BVT BWA CAF CAN CCK CHE CHL CHN CIV CMR COD COG COK
COL COM CPV CRI CUB CXR CYM CYP CZE DEU DJI DMA DNK DOM DZA ECU
EGY ERI ESP EST ETH FIN FJI FLK FRA FRO FSM GAB GBR GEO GGY GHA GIB
GIN GMB GNB GNQ GRC GRD GRL GTM GUF GUM GUY HKG HMD HND HRV HTI
HUN IDN IMN IND IOT IRL IRN IRQ ISL ISR ITA JAM JEY JOR JPN KAZ KEN KGZ
KHM KIR KNA KOR KWT LAO LBN LBR LBY LCA LIE LKA LSO LTU LUX LVA
MAC MAR MDA MDG MDV MEX MHL MKD MLI MLT MMR MNE MNG MNP MOZ
MRT MSR MUS MWI MYS MYT NAM NCL NER NFK NGA NIC NIU NLD NOR NPL
NRU NZL OMN PAK PAN PCN PER PHL PLW PNG POL PRI PRK PRT PRY PSE
PYF QAT ROU RUS RWA SAU SCG SDN SEN SGP SGS SHN SLB SLE SLV SMR SOM
SRB STP SUR SVK SVN SWE SWZ SYC SYR TCA TCD TGO THA TJK TKL TKM
TLS TON TTO TUN TUR TUV TWN TZA UGA UKR UMI URY USA UZB VAT VCT
VEN VGB VIR VNM VUT WLF WSM YEM YUG ZAF ZMB ZWE
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Table A2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STAijt 44322 0.13 0.34 0 1
STAijt-1 44322 0.01 0.10 0 1
STAijt-2 44322 0.01 0.10 0 1
STAijt-3 44322 0.01 0.10 0 1
STAijt-4 44322 0.01 0.11 0 1
STAijt-5 44322 0.01 0.11 0 1
STAijt-6 44322 0.01 0.10 0 1
STAijt-7 44322 0.01 0.09 0 1
STAijt-8 44322 0.004 0.07 0 1
STAijt-9 44322 0.004 0.06 0 1
STAijt-10 44322 0.003 0.05 0 1
STAijt+1 44322 0.002 0.05 0 1
STAijt+2 44322 0.002 0.04 0 1
STAijt+3 44322 0.002 0.05 0 1
STAijt+4 44322 0.002 0.05 0 1
STAijt+5 44322 0.002 0.05 0 1
Xijt 44322 385.07 2068.71 0 63564.5
lnXijt 24622 3.77 2.62 -13.8155 11.05981
Xijt+minXj 44322 385.49 2068.64 0 63564.5
ln(Xijt+minXj) 44310 0.07 5.24 -13.8155 11.05981
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